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THE DODD-FRANK ACT IS WORKING AND WILL
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IF IT IS NOT
KILLED BEFORE FULLY IMPLEMENTED
DENNIS M. KELLEHER*
STEPHEN W. HALL
FRANK MEDINA
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2008, the nation’s financial system teetered on the
brink of collapse, staggered by the worst financial crisis since the Great
Crash of 1929. The ensuing economic wreckage it caused was the worst
since the Great Depression. Indeed, while a second Great Depression was
just narrowly avoided,1 the economic carnage will still cost the country
more than $20 trillion in lost GDP or more than $170,000 for every man,
woman and child alive in the United States today. 2
Although the 2008 financial crisis reached a crescendo during a
September week that saw the failure of Lehman Brothers, the collapse
and $100 billion bailout of the insurance giant AIG, a run on and bailout
of the $3.7 trillion money market fund industry, the near-death
experiences and bailouts of Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Bank of America,
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the crisis was years in the making.
Rather than a bolt-from-the blue “Black Swan” event, the financial crisis
resulted from profound changes in banking, finance, and the financial
system, including but not limited to the:

* Dennis M. Kelleher is President and CEO, Stephen W. Hall is the Legal Director and
Securities Specialist, and Frank Medina is a Senior Counsel and Director of Research at Better
Markets, Inc. (www.bettermarkets.com), “Better Markets is a non-profit, non-partisan, and
independent organization founded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to promote the
public interest in the financial markets, support the financial reform of Wall Street and make
our financial system work for all Americans again.”
1. See generally, Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act (2015).
2. See The Cost of the Crisis: $20 Trillion and Counting, Better Markets, (Jul. 2015)
[hereinafter Cost of the Crisis], http://www.bettermarkets.com/costofthecrisis.
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collapse in underwriting standards;
proliferation of no skin-in-the-game “originateto-distribute” products and business models;
sale of tricked-up toxic subprime mortgages to
consumers who didn’t understand and/or couldn’t
afford them;
sale, packaging, and distribution of these
mortgages throughout the global financial
system;
creation of complex derivatives as well as
derivatives of derivatives in an unregulated,
opaque over-the-counter market;
credit rating agencies that blindly blessed these
mortgages, securities, and derivatives with
undeserved triple-A ratings;
compensation schemes that rewarded and
incentivized taking the highest risk possible
without regard for the consequences;
deregulation of banking, finance, and financial
consumer protection, often due to the misguided
belief that the least regulation is the best
regulation and a “market knows best” ideology;
outbreak of predatory behavior and consumer
exploitation; and
pervasive fraud, illegality and, at times, criminal
behavior at many levels of many financial
institutions, including in particular at the gigantic
too-big-to-fail banks and nonbank financial
institutions.

The financial crisis exposed and exacerbated the weaknesses and
flaws that had developed in virtually every level of the financial system.
It also demonstrated that the regulatory system that may have been
adequate to oversee the simpler financial system of the twentieth century
was incapable of monitoring the risks generated by the considerably more
complex and tightly inter-connected financial system of the twenty-first

2016]

DODD-FRANK IS WORKING

129

century. This was, of course, made much worse by years of de-regulation
and lack of enforcement. Regardless of the reasons, there is no doubt that
the regulatory system in place was not capable of handling a large-scale
crisis.
And the crisis came. In addition to the $20 trillion cost referenced
above, the 2008 crisis also inflicted incalculable human suffering, as tens
of millions of Americans lost their jobs, homes, savings, and so much
more. To prevent the financial system from completely imploding and
utterly devastating the economy, the government devoted trillions of
dollars in expenditures, backstops, and guarantees to rescue financial
institutions and to stabilize the U.S. and global economies. Given the
historic financial and economic shock to the country, the recovery has
been painfully slow and arduous for the families and communities of
America. In fact, the economic damage and the human misery caused by
the 2008 crisis continue to burden millions of Americans today, over
seven years after the crisis began to unfold.3
In response, Congress and the Obama Administration passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank Act”),4 the most comprehensive reform of the country’s financial
laws since the Great Depression of the 1930s. That law thoroughly
overhauled or enhanced virtually every aspect of financial market
regulation in all sectors: banking, securities, commodities, derivatives,
and consumer protection. It also created two entirely new regulatory
agencies: the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to better protect
Americans from predatory behavior by banks and other financial market
participants; and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to identify
and address potentially dangerous concentrations of risk anywhere in our
financial system, including in particular those risks posed by systemically
significant non-bank financial firms, the so-called “shadow banking
system.” Given the global nature of the crisis, governments around the
world and, in particular, Europe also recognized the need for profound
changes in their approach to financial market regulation, and they too
3. See Dennis Kelleher, A Stronger State of the Union Begins with Reining in Wall
Street, Huffington Post (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-m-kelleher/astronger-state-of-the-u_b_8912536.html.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DoddFrank”), Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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initiated major reforms, many of which parallel the Dodd-Frank Act.
Not surprisingly, given the breadth and complexity of the
financial reform law, our federal regulatory agencies (the Federal Reserve
Board, SEC, CFTC, FDIC, OCC, and others) were tasked with proposing,
revising, finalizing, implementing, interpreting, and enforcing a broad
array of rules to implement it. Most of the law and implementing rules
were directed at the fifty or so systemically significant banks and
nonbank financial firms that pose a unique danger to the financial system
and the economy due to their size, complexity, leverage,
interconnectedness, or high risk activities. These are the so-called “toobig-to-fail” firms.
Given that the actions and activities of these too-big-to-fail firms
largely caused the crash and necessitated the law, Dodd-Frank focused
on either reducing or eliminating the highest risk and most dangerous
activities of these too-big-to fail firms. That, however, also threatened
some of their business lines, profits, and bonus pools. As a result, at every
stage of the lawmaking and rulemaking, the too-big-to-fail firms, largely
centered on Wall Street, and their allies have spared no expense in waging
a relentless war to kill, gut, or weaken the financial reform. They, the
firms, their lobbyists and political allies, have:










aggressively lobbied Congress during the
consideration of the law that became the DoddFrank Act;
lobbied the regulatory agencies as the rules were
being considered, proposed, and finalized;
pressured the agencies during the implementation
and interpretation of the finalized rules to “win”
what they lost in the rulemaking process;
filed lawsuits challenging not only portions of the
statute but also rules promulgated by the agencies
when the rules did not come out the way they
wanted;
filed bills and amendments to weaken, roll back,
or kill parts of the law or rules; and
held hundreds of hearings, too often to harass the
regulators, and inundated the regulators with
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letters and document and information requests
that have needlessly consumed countless hours
and expense.
Throughout this process, Wall Street and its allies have deployed
a variety of strategies: They have downplayed or ignored altogether the
severity of the financial crash and economic crisis;5 they have denied or
obscured their central role in causing it;6 they have cast blame everywhere
but on themselves by faulting the government, regulators, GSEs,
homeowners, and even consumers;7 they have issued dire but unfounded
predictions about the impact of the law and new regulations on the
financial industry and the economy as a whole;8 and they have insisted
that every new rule must pass muster under a painstaking and quantitative
cost-benefit analysis before being implemented.9
5. Kelleher, et al., The Cost of The Wall Street-Caused Financial Collapse and Ongoing
Economic Crisis is More than $12.8 Trillion, 7 (Sept. 15, 2012) (“Wall Street and its many
allies and sympathizers are denying and understating the costs of the crisis, primarily to kill,
weaken,
or
avoid
financial
reform
and
re-regulation.”),
https://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Cost%20Of%20The%20Crisis_2.pdf.
6. Id. at 10.
7. See e.g., Suzanne McGee, 5 Years After the Crash: Blame Washington or Wall
Street,
The
Fiscal
Times
(Sept.
16,
2013),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2013/09/16/5-Years-After-Crisis-BlameWashington-or-Wall-Street (elaborating on the post-crisis claims made by Wall Street firms
about regulatory failure).
8. See generally Jonathan Weisman & Eric Lipton, Wall Street Chips Away at DoddFrank Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2015, at A1 (detailing a number of doomsday predictions
that Wall Street and its allies have made about Dodd-Frank); The Dodd-Frank Act Five Years
Later: Are We More Prosperous? Before the H. Financial Services Committee, 114th Cong.
15 (Jul. 28, 2015) (statement of Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy
Studies, American Enterprise Institute) (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act is . . . creating the foundation
for another financial crisis.”); The Dodd Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We More Free?
Before the H. Financial Services Committee, 114th Cong. 13 (Sep. 17, 2015) (statement of
Todd Zywicki, George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, Mercatus Center
Senior Scholar) (“Dodd-Frank has interjected the tentacles of the federal regulatory state into
every aspect of our financial system, and as a result we are less free to obtain the means to
make our lives better.”).
9. See, e.g., Sam Batkins, Dodd-Frank Fails at Measuring Costs and Benefits, American
Action Forum (Feb. 19, 2015), http://americanactionforum.org/insights/dodd-frank-fails-atmeasuring-costs-and-benefits; Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 Stan. L. Rev. Online 9 (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dodd-frank-regulators-cost-benefit-analysis-andagency-capture; Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis
in Financial Regulation, U.S. Chamber of Com. Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness (Mar.
2013), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CBA-Report-
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This is the context that is missing from most critiques of the
Dodd-Frank Act, especially those that call for rigorous cost-benefit
analysis of rulemakings.10 Yet this backdrop is critically important.
Reflecting on the impact of financial reform is a fair and useful exercise:
Based on our experience so far, what can we say about the impact of the
Dodd-Frank Act? Too often, however, critics of financial reform largely
ignore the context and facts that gave rise to the law, including the actual
financial crash and the economic wreckage it caused, when answering
this question. Without fully considering the roots of the crisis, its terrible
costs, and the need for fundamental regulatory reform, it is far too easy
for critics to dismiss the new regulatory framework as simply
unnecessary or even harmful, or to portray it as the work of misguided
advocates devoted to regulation for its own sake.
In essence, rather than engaging in fair-minded, unbiased, and
balanced assessment of the impact of Dodd-Frank, opponents frequently
feed into industry-created and inflated fears and myths about the law. But
merely reciting and restating these baseless speculations regarding the
supposedly harmful impact of financial reform does not transform them
into actual data elucidating where we are in the reform process, where we
should be, or where we need to go.
In this article, we offer contrasting views on three major recurring
themes in criticisms of Dodd-Frank:
1. Opponents often advance negative portrayals of reform
advocates and regulators; fail to acknowledge the lessons
of the financial crisis; and disregard Wall Street’s
relentless efforts to weaken the law, exploit its gaps,
violate existing regulations.
2. Many of those who challenge financial reform also
extol the virtues of rigorous cost-benefit analysis, and
staunchly advocate that it should serve not only as a

3.10.131.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Steven Sloan, Cost-Benefit Analysis Puts the Brakes on Dodd-Frank,
Bloomberg Bus. (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-07/costbenefit-analysis-puts-the-brakes-on-dodd-frank.
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metric for judging the Dodd-Frank Act, but also as the
template for all future rulemakings. Yet Congress,
courts, and respected academics acknowledge that costbenefit analysis is a burdensome, incomplete, and
inaccurate methodology that hinders rather than promotes
the development of sound financial regulation.
Furthermore, sensible and sound rules are the sine qua
non of fair, efficient and workable financial markets.
Indeed, without regulation, there would be no free
markets.
3. Recent findings show that the Dodd-Frank reforms
appear to be working as intended without the costs and
burdens predicted by its critics. Unable to point to a
credible, empirically-based assessment of the law’s
effects, Dodd-Frank’s critics revert to purely speculative
warnings about the harmful impact it “could” have.
The short answer to the previously posed question, in the simplest
terms, is this: It is too soon to know how effective Dodd-Frank will be,
but the evidence so far—rather than agenda-driven speculation and
claims—indicates that the statute is working as intended; that it will help
reduce the likelihood or severity of another financial crisis; and that it
will not choke the life out of the financial industry or stifle economic
growth, but will, in fact, serve as the foundation for a thriving financial
industry that supports stability, growth, employment, and broad-based
prosperity.
This is, after all, what happened to the banking and financial
industries and the U.S. economy following the Great Depression, when
innumerable laws and regulations were passed. Those reforms imposed
some of the heaviest financial regulation in the history of the world. Yet,
the U.S. economy boomed, the financial industry expanded with soaring
profits, and the country built the largest middle class ever, all under
extensive and unprecedented regulation. Growth continued until the
financial industry and its allies promoted and sold the myth that markets
knew best and that the least regulation was the best regulation. That Wall
Street-funded ideology ushered in an era of deregulation, unbridled risk-
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taking, and illegal activity rising in some cases to the level of criminality.
This history is powerful proof that regulation is simply not the enemy of
growth and prosperity, but that broad-based de-regulation is.
The truth is that strong, robust, effective markets require equally
strong, robust, and effective rules that establish a level playing field,
enable competition, enforce a baseline of fair dealing, police market
participants, engender investor confidence, and ultimately lead to a
balanced financial system that fuels the American economy and raises the
standard of living of all Americans.
II. FORGETTING THE PAST AND IGNORING THE PRESENT: THE DODDFRANK ACT WAS NECESSITATED BY A CRISIS OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS
AND WALL STREET’S CONTINUED RECKLESSNESS, FRAUD, AND ABUSE
The frequent attempt by opponents of the Dodd-Frank Act to
portray pro-reform advocates as mindlessly and baselessly infatuated
with regulation for its own sake is wrong for many reasons. The DoddFrank Act and its implementing regulations were necessitated by a crisis
of historic proportions and by Wall Street’s inability to police itself as
evidenced by numerous instances of recklessness, fraud, and abuse.
First and foremost, the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementing
regulations did not spring from a sudden, inexplicable Congressional
impulse to pass laws and require numerous rulemakings for no reason.
The many problems that culminated in the crisis manifested themselves
at virtually every level of the financial system, starting with the toxic
mortgages peddled to consumers by a new species of non-bank mortgage
company all the way to the over-leveraged investment banks that
packaged these mortgages and sold them to investors as ultra-safe assets.
And when the financial crisis exploded, regulators found not only that
they had missed the growing risks that spilled over the traditional
boundaries separating commercial banks, broker-dealers, and insurance
companies, but also that they were ill-equipped to face the extraordinary
panics and runs they were confronting. The financial system had grown
far more complex and inter-connected than they realized in the years
since Congress enacted the banking and securities laws in the wake of the
Great Depression.
When it came to addressing the weaknesses and flaws in the
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financial and regulatory system that caused the crisis, the Dodd-Frank
Act was, in the best judgment of Congress, the President, and countless
experts, essential to protect our financial markets and our economy from
another devastating financial and economic crisis.11 The anti-reform
lobby consistently fails to acknowledge the scale and scope of the 2008
financial crash, its underlying causes, and the costs it will inflict on the
families and communities of the United States.
Second, the continuing need for strong regulation and
enforcement is painfully evidenced by the never-ending pattern of
lawlessness on Wall Street. The financial crisis itself, of course, largely
resulted from reckless, illegal, and at times criminal misconduct by large
financial institutions. For example, they engaged in illegal mortgage
underwriting practices and fraudulently packaged and sold wave upon
wave of toxic residential mortgage backed securities, which became the
fuel for the crisis.12 But more to the point, since then, Wall Street has
continued to engage in a breathtaking array of illegal activities, including
manipulation of the foreign currency market and the LIBOR benchmark,
aiding and abetting tax evasion, and money laundering.13 Again, the antireform lobby consistently fails to acknowledge this pattern of illegal
conduct that cries out not only for the Dodd-Frank reforms, but much
stronger regulatory and enforcement measures.
Any fair-minded analysis of the years before the crisis would
conclude that de-regulation, not over-regulation, laid the groundwork for
the crisis by permitting and incentivizing wanton high risk activities and
in many cases, illegal and criminal conduct. Thus, from the standpoint of
strengthening systemic stability, as well as protecting hardworking
Americans from fraud and abuse, more regulation of financial services—
not less—was, is, and for the foreseeable future will remain, essential.
The conduct of the financial industry is what has made it so necessary.
There are 20 trillion reasons not to let Wall Street police itself again and

11. None of that is to say the law is perfect. No law is. It is, however, the best law our
political system could produce at the time. Moreover, it was the best law that could be
produced in the face of Wall Street’s dedication of virtually unlimited resources to kill or
weaken it. Indeed, much of the length and complexity in the law (and the implementing rules)
so often cited by critics resulted from lobbying by the financial industry itself.
12. See Cost of the Crisis, supra note 2, at 83–84.
13. Id. at 85–87.
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not to be deluded by an anti-regulatory zeal based on blind faith in a
discredited “markets know best” ideology.14
III. REVERENCE FOR ONEROUS, YET INNOCENT SOUNDING, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS: A WEAPON DESIGNED TO KILL OR WEAKEN THE
MOST SENSIBLE AND NECESSARY REGULATION
Dodd-Frank’s opponents, and proponents of less federal financial
regulation in general, hold up rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis
not only as the best metric for judging the success of Dodd-Frank, but
also as the best template for all future rulemaking. 15 If such a broadlyapplicable cost-benefit policy were adopted, it would severely limit the
ability of lawmakers and regulators to protect the American people from
fraud, abuse, and systemic instability in the financial markets. In
practice, such cost-benefit analysis prioritizes Wall Street’s narrow cost
interests above the public interest; places a huge drain on already scarce
agency resources; prolongs the rulemaking process interminably;
produces results that are notoriously incomplete, imprecise and
unreliable; leads to weaker final rules; and provides the unfortunate
breeding ground for contrived industry attacks on the rules in court.
Faith in the virtues of rigorous, quantifiable cost-benefit analysis
is fundamentally misplaced. The truth is that Congress, the courts, and
commentators all recognize the profound flaws in the cost-benefit
methodology. They also recognize that it is often promoted by industry
advocates not because it leads to strong and effective regulation, but
because it is a singularly effective weapon in the fight to slow, weaken,
and kill financial reform.16
With relatively few exceptions, Congress deliberately avoids

14. Put differently, one could argue that the 2008 financial crisis was the most expensive
cost-benefit analysis the world has ever conducted: no one has to guess at the horrific costs
of an ineffective regulatory system. We now know that it is more than $20 trillion. Id.
15. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, The Case for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulations, Regulation (Winter 2013-2014); Jon C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, Yale L.J. 553, 882–1011 (2012).
16. See generally Setting the Record Straight on Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financial
Reform at the SEC, Better Markets, Inc. (Jul. 30, 2012) [hereinafter CBA Report],
https://www.bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Setting%20The%20Record%20Straight.p
df.
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saddling financial regulators with the onerous duty to conduct rigorous
cost-benefit analysis when developing rules to regulate the financial
markets. In the securities laws, for example, Congress imposed on the
SEC a much more limited obligation simply to consider three specific
economic factors when promulgating rules, without any duty to quantify
or compare them.17 This reflects Congress’s long-standing judgment that
the benefits of protecting investors and the public interest must not be
subordinated to excessive concern about quantifying the costs of
regulation imposed on the financial industry.
The compelling reasons for this are clear, as a recent court
decision stated: requiring cost-benefit analysis would put the SEC in the
untenable position of second-guessing Congress’s judgment about the
need for regulation, and would require an “apples-to-bricks” comparison
of costs and benefits.18 The D.C. Circuit has recently affirmed this
principle in rejecting attacks on SEC and CFTC rules. For example, in
ICI v. CFTC,19 the court declared that “[w]here Congress has required
‘rigorous, quantitative economic analysis,’ it has made that requirement
clear in the agency’s statute, but it has imposed no such requirement
here.”20
The Office of Management and Budget, the steward of executive
branch compliance with cost-benefit analysis, acknowledges the inherent
difficulty in quantifying regulatory costs and benefits:
Many rules have benefits or costs that cannot be
quantified or monetized in light of existing
information. . . . In fulfilling their statutory mandates,
agencies must often act in the face of substantial
uncertainty about the likely consequences. In some cases,

17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(t), 78w(a)(2) (2015); see generally CBA Report, supra note 16.
18. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19. Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
20. That is also why longstanding Supreme Court precedent has declared that an
agency’s duty to conduct such rigorous cost-benefit analysis is not to be inferred lightly or
without a clear indication from Congress. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490, 510–512 & n. 30 (1981) (stating that “Congress uses specific language when
intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis”).
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quantification of various effects is highly speculative.21
Thus, under cost-benefit analysis, many advantages of
regulation, no matter how important to society or to properly functioning
markets, may be disregarded or simply not captured in the calculation.22
As a result, cost-benefit analysis can become an “industry-cost only
analysis,” which inevitably shifts regulatory policy in favor of industry
and away from protecting investors or other public interests.23
Recent academic analysis also highlights the flaws in cost-benefit
analysis. For example, one commentator concluded that early D.C.
Circuit cases on cost-benefit analysis placed impossible burdens on the
SEC, given the nature of financial regulation: “[T]he D.C. Circuit’s
opinions set standards for economic analysis that no agency rulemaking
could possibly comply with.”24 Another analysis concluded that “[t]he
D.C. Circuit presented no evidence that there is any available scientific
technique for the SEC to ‘assess the economic effects’ of the rule along
the lines that the court seemed to think legally required.”25
In fact, critics of cost-benefit analysis have long warned that it is
used as a “device not for producing the right kind and amount of
regulation, but for diminishing the role of regulation even when it was
beneficial.”26 As observed by one court, the imposition of technical and
burdensome requirements relating to cost-benefit analysis “serve[s] as a
dilatory device, obstructing the agency from proceeding with its primary
mission.”27
Any requirement that a rigorous quantitative cost-benefit analysis
accompany all new rulemakings would have precisely this obstructive
impact. It would dramatically tip the entire legal and rulemaking analysis

21. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 2011 Report to Cong. on the Benefits and Costs of
Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, 4 (2011).
22. See Am. Fin. Services Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
23. See Kelleher, et al., supra note 5, at 8.
24. See Bruce R. Kraus, Economists in the Room at the SEC, 124 Yale L.J. F. 280
(2015).
25. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 1, 918–19 (2015).
26. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (1995).
27. FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978–79 (4th Cir. 1976).
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in favor of the financial industry and against the public interest.
Finally, the call for rule-by-rule cost-benefit analysis is premised
on an overly narrow conception of regulatory reform, a process that must
be viewed holistically. The Dodd-Frank Act is a comprehensive law
designed to re-regulate an entire industry that poses a unique and lethal
threat to the financial system and economy of the entire country, as well
as to the economic security and well-being of every American. Congress
passed and the President signed a comprehensive law for a reason: Only
a collection of interrelated and highly dependent provisions could create
an overall architecture of financial reform adequate to prevent the next
crisis or significantly reduce its severity and costs. Demanding a costbenefit analysis of each rule in isolation–and attacking rules one by one
in court on that basis–ignores the critical benefits of the entire collection
of reforms and poses a serious threat to the reform process.28
IV. DISTORTING AND SELECTIVELY REVIEWING THE DATA: A GROWING
BODY OF EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE DODD-FRANK ACT IS
REALIZING ITS PROMISE WITHOUT THE PREDICTED SIDE-EFFECTS
As a threshold point, it is premature to attempt a comprehensive,
empirically-based assessment of the impact of Dodd-Frank. The reason
is obvious. The statute has not even been fully implemented because not
all of the rules mandated or authorized under the law have been written
and finalized. Moreover, most of the rules that are in place have had very
little time to produce their intended effects. The GAO put the matter
succinctly in its most recent review of the Act: “The full impact of the
Dodd-Frank Act remains uncertain because many of its rules have yet to
be implemented and insufficient time has passed to evaluate others.”29
28. Moreover, the history of regulation in this country amply demonstrates that Congress
is well aware of how to impose rigorous, quantitative cost benefit analysis requirements. Yet
Congress chose not to do so in the Dodd Frank Act. Under familiar canons of statutory
interpretation, no such requirements should be imposed in the absence of a clear
Congressional mandate. See Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to
the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 10–11 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 14/46, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1446.pdf
(arguing that the effects of the economic crisis, subsequent supervision, and the institution of
regulations should be done comprehensively, instead of addressing specific problems on an
individual basis).
29. U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-16-169, Dodd-Frank Regulations: Impacts on
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These simple facts have not dissuaded opponents of the DoddFrank Act from continuing to make baseless and dire predictions
regarding its effects.30 These predictions range from warnings that DoddFrank will cause general economic harm to warnings that it may cause
the next financial crisis. Popular regulatory targets include the much
maligned Volcker Rule and the FSOC’s SIFI designation regime.31
Those who attempt to justify such dramatic predictions with
purported lessons from history ignore the clearest, most direct, and most
compelling lesson from the past. For seventy-five years, from the
reforms of the early 1930’s to the 2008 crash, regulation led to prosperity
and de-regulation led to disaster. In fact, for almost a century, Wall Street
has responded to every major new regulatory reform with confident and
alarming predictions that it will not only crush the financial services
industry, but also cause grave damage to the larger economy, kill growth,
and cause widespread unemployment. And in every case, these “skywill-fall” predictions proved to be wrong. Major reforms, including the

Community Banks, Credit Unions and Systemically Important Institutions 1 (2015)
[hereinafter GAO Report].
30. A prime example is Dodd-Frank: What It Does and Why It’s Flawed (Hester Peirce
& James Broughel eds., Mercatus Center at George Mason University 2012). This critique
of Dodd-Frank concedes up front that the “implementation” of the law is “far from complete,”
but it then purports to evaluate whether the law is an “effective response to the financial
crisis.” Id. at 11. What follows is a title-by-title rehash of theoretical criticisms of the law
and pure speculation about its supposedly awful future consequences, including repeated
warnings that it “could . . . lay the groundwork for a future financial crisis.” Id. (emphasis
added). The only empirical analysis is an odd chapter tallying up the considerable number of
new requirements or “restrictions” that the law and its implementing rules are expected to
impose, with little about its actual impact on our financial system. Id. at 193–200. Notably,
the book lays out almost none of the essential context as it picks at the law—barely any
mention of the devastation wrought by the financial crisis and scant analysis of its core
underlying causes.
31. Attacks on FSOC’s exercise of its designation authority exemplify the problem. See,
e.g., Investment Company Institute, SIFI Designation is Unnecessary for Regulated Funds—
and Would Be Harmful to Funds, Investors, and the Capital Markets (2016),
https://www.ici.org/policy/regulation/stability/sifi_designation_tps. In reality, the FSOC has
proceeded cautiously, designating only four large financial institutions in nearly six years.
Moreover, its process has been thorough, deliberative, and fair to those institutions, as
illustrated in its approach to the designation of MetLife. See Metlife, Inc. v. Financial
Stability Oversight Council, No. 1:15-cv-45 (RMC), 2015 U.S. Dist. (D.D.C. 2015). Finally,
the designations to date have resulted in none of the predicted harms to investors or our capital
markets. On the contrary, it appears that their primary impact has been to induce some of the
designees to re-evaluate their business structures and to make changes that ultimately will
have the intended effect of making our system less vulnerable to material financial distress.
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countless laws and voluminous regulations enacted during the 1930s,
actually paved the way for unprecedented financial market stability and
economic prosperity in the United States. Throughout it all, the financial
services industry continues to prosper, with salaries and bonuses
dwarfing the incomes of most Americans—who nevertheless must pay
the price when Wall Street’s high risk, reckless, and illegal conduct
becomes unsustainable and the system collapses.
If this history is any guide, then we can expect the Dodd-Frank
Act to help protect the stability and integrity of our financial markets,
protect consumers and investors, and promote economic growth for the
foreseeable future without the terrible side effects predicted by naysayers.
Attempts to prove the dangers of regulation by invoking the
savings and loan crisis as well as the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis are unconvincing. These
episodes do not demonstrate that regulation causes financial disasters.
Even if we were to assume that injudicious regulation can sometimes
contribute to a financial crisis, in neither the savings and loan episode nor
the financial crisis of 2008 was that by any stretch the principal cause of
the catastrophe. Rather, it was the high risk, reckless, and often illegal
conduct by financial institutions, coupled with inadequate or totally
absent regulation and enforcement, that led to disaster. In any case,
neither of these examples shed any light whatsoever on whether Congress
got it right in 2010 when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act.
The anti-reform lobby also misinterprets the significance of the
various regulatory costs and consequences associated with the DoddFrank Act. Among the adverse effects feared are increased regulatory
compliance costs and a reduction in the financial products and services
available to the public. But even if we assume that these more general
cost predictions come true, they are not evidence that the Dodd-Frank Act
reforms are flawed or injurious.
These regulatory impacts were certainly not unforeseen, nor are
they necessarily bad. Congress obviously understood that regulation
designed to rein in Wall Street would impose very substantial costs on
the industry, not only in the form of additional compliance measures but
also in the form of prohibited activities that were once highly profitable
but unacceptably risky (such as the Volcker Rule ban on proprietary
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trading).32 Similarly, Congress understood that some of those costs may
be passed on to consumers and may result in fewer “choices” and less
credit availability (think capital, liquidity, and margin rules).33 But this
too is a natural consequence of sound regulation, and it is the more-thanacceptable price of a more stable, transparent, and fair financial system,
less prone to the devastating, multi-trillion dollar cost of another financial
crisis.
Indeed, there is a strong argument that the Dodd-Frank Act
especially, and financial reform generally, will result in no incremental
costs and may actually save the United States and its citizens money, not
to mention untold human misery. How could this be? It is really a
question of who pays those costs and when. Would we rather have the
financial industry bear the costs of its high risk activities in the ordinary
course of business,34 accepting that some of those costs will be passed on
to its clients who seek, need, or want those high risk activities? Or, would
we rather that everyone in the country pay for those high risk activities
after they lead to a financial crash and economic tragedy? It is not only
rational, but appropriate for society to determine that the former is much
preferable to the latter, particularly when we know the latter just cost the
country more than $20 trillion and widespread human suffering from
coast to coast.
Regardless, the available evidence at this very early stage
suggests that the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act is precisely what it should
be. For example, the GAO’s most recent review of the Act paints a
positive picture, based on a number of indicators. As to large bank
holding companies, while they still have a long way to go, they have
decreased their leverage; liquidity has improved; they have suffered little
impact on their funding costs presumably due to improvements in their
safety and soundness; and they have been requiring their counterparties

32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); 12 C.F.R. §§ 44, 248, 351 (2015); 17 C.F.R. §§ 75, 255 (2015).
33. See Donna Borak, Four Years Later, Economic Cost of Dodd-Frank Remains
Elusive, Am. Banker, Jul. 18, 2014 (noting that “some portion of the regulatory cost is going
to be passed on to the customers”).
34. This is a rather pedestrian economic concept of requiring companies to internalize
their costs, rather than externalizing them onto the public, i.e., eliminating an unfair and
unseen public subsidy or, in finance, the Greenspan or, if you will, the Bernanke put.
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to post more collateral against derivatives contracts. 35 In fact, the Bank
for International Settlements has found that the world’s largest, most
systemically important banks have become substantially better
capitalized than they were in the years before the crisis, and—despite the
baseless but dire warnings of rule bashers—they continue to lend.36 As
to smaller banks and credit unions, while they have experienced some
increased compliance costs, borrowers have experienced only minimal to
moderate reductions in the availability of credit, and no discernable
impact on mortgage lending.37
V. CONCLUSION
Many critics of the Dodd-Frank Act fail to acknowledge the full
breadth and scope of the 2008 financial crash, the economic devastation
that resulted, and the underlying causes of the crisis. They also ignore
the relevant historical precedents of the Great Crash of 1929, the Great
Depression of the 1930s, and the enormously beneficial regulation of the
financial industry that emerged from that era. Therefore, they also fail to
illuminate the core question regarding the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Unsupported imaginings about the supposedly dreadful impact of the
Dodd Frank Act cloud the debate and fuel the passions of those who
ardently oppose all regulation however modest, sensible, or necessary.
Moreover, a prescription for mandatory rigorous cost-benefit analysis at
every financial regulator for every rule—in the face of overwhelming
evidence showing that such an approach is counterproductive and
harmful—would be disastrous for our financial system, our economy, and
the lives and livelihoods of all Americans.
We know that the financial crisis cost Americans more than $20
trillion and incalculable human suffering. In response to that crisis, the
American people—through their elected representatives—enacted the
Dodd-Frank Act. We must allow the law a full and fair opportunity to
take effect and stabilize our financial system, not undermine it with

35. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 1.
36. Bank for Int’l Settlements, How Have Banks Adjusted to Higher Capital
Requirements, BIS Quarterly Review (Sept. 2013).
37. GAO Report, supra note 29, at 1.
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relentless attempts to obstruct its implementation and roll back its
protections on the basis of alarmist and groundless speculation. The
evidence so far indicates that the reforms are benefitting our financial
system in the ways intended, without the dire consequences predicted by
critics.

